The Holding-Dicta Spectrum by Michaels, Andrew
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
The Holding-Dicta Spectrum 
Andrew Michaels 
The George Washington University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michaels, Andrew C., The Holding-Dicta Spectrum (December 1, 2016). GWU Law School Public Law 
Research Paper No. 2017-1; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-1. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2863989 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2863989 
Andrew	C.	Michaels	 The	Holding-Dicta	Spectrum	 DRAFT	–	Jan.	2017	
1	
The Holding-Dicta Spectrum Andrew	C.	Michaels*	
Abstract 
The distinction between holding and dictum is often treated under a binary 
paradigm; either a proposition is binding holding, or unconstraining dictum.  But 
the binary paradigm is too simplistic to adequately model our complex system of 
precedent.  This article suggests an alternative spectrum paradigm where the 
constraining force of a precedent proposition is inversely correlated with its 
breadth.  This article explains the spectrum approach, compares it with prevailing 
approaches, and evaluates some cases in light of the spectrum model.  The 
spectrum framework has the potential to facilitate judicial candor and make the 
concepts of holding and dicta more consistently meaningful. 
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The Holding-Dicta Spectrum 
 
“If judges are free, are indeed forced, to decide new cases for 
which there is no rule, they must at least make a rule as they 
decide.  So far, good.  But how wide, or how narrow, is the general 
rule in this particular case?  That is a troublesome matter.”1 
Introduction 
 
Though rather ubiquitous in our legal system, despite much discussion and 
debate, the distinction between holding and dicta remains far from clear.2  There 
are, however, two propositions that are often taken for granted.  The first is that 
holdings are binding and dicta are not.3  The second is that if a statement is not 
holding then it is dictum, and vice versa.4  These two assumptions set up a binary 
paradigm; either a proposition is binding holding, or unconstraining dictum, one 
																																																								
1 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 39 (1930). 
 
2 See, e.g., Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 
76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 219, 219 (2010); Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 
509, 512 (1952). 
 
3 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 953, 957 (2005); Marc McAllister, Dicta Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 161, 165-66 (2011).  
 
4 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta & Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2004 
(1994) (“we would find consensus for the judgment that everything that is not 
holding is dictum and everything that is not dictum is holding”); Abramowicz & 
Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 961 (“If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case 
counts as dicta.”); Judith M. Stinson, Teaching the Holding/Dictum Distinction, 
19 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 192, 192 (2011) (“Dictum, 
on the other hand, is anything that is not a holding.”). 
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or the other.  And therein lies a significant part of the problem, for in reality, our 
system of precedent is more complex than the binary paradigm suggests.5   
Consider for example a court deciding whether a particular car is allowed 
in a park, which in explaining its decision, states: “no vehicles are allowed in the 
park.”  This statement is of course broader than necessary to decide the case, but 
nevertheless it is part of the path of reasoning that leads to the judgment.  Then, a 
subsequent court constrained by the precedent of the first court is faced with the 
question of whether a wheelchair is allowed in the park.  Even if we assume that a 
wheelchair is indisputably a vehicle, it is not hard to imagine the constrained court 
allowing the wheelchair.  The reasons that might have led the precedent court to 
generalize against vehicles probably are not fully applicable to wheelchairs, and 
wheelchairs present special countervailing considerations.  So the constrained 
court might narrow the rule against vehicles by creating an exception for mobility 
aids.  This type of narrowing happens all the time.6  
Was the statement “no vehicles are allowed in the park” a holding?  If 
holdings are binding, then the answer is no, because the hypothetical constrained 
court did not follow it even though it applied.  So does that make the statement 																																																								
5 See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 195 
(2013); Shawn Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125 (2009). 
 
6 See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 
GEO. L. J. 921, 924 (2016) (“narrowing from below happens all the time”); 
Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
1861, 1865 (2014) (“narrowing happens all the time”); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE 
CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 15 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 
1989) (written in German in 1928) (“It is common to see a later narrowing of a 
ratio that, in the heat of the moment and of the argument, was too broadly 
phrased.”); see also, Part III, infra. 
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dicta?  If so, why is it dicta?  Because it is broader than necessary to decide the 
case?  At least in the common law context, almost any generalization is broader 
than necessary to decide the case. 7  
Michael Dorf has distinguished between two types of statements which are 
sometimes called dicta: asides, and broad statements.8  A clear example of an 
aside would be if the precedent court in the hypothetical case above had said “and 
by the way, no grills in the park either.”  This is an aside because the question of 
grills in the park was not before that court.  Asides are pure quintessential dicta.9  
The statement “no vehicles in the park” is a broad statement, the second type of 
potential dicta, as it encompassed the facts before the court – (cars are vehicles) – 
and would have been part of the path of reasoning that led to the judgment.   
																																																								
7 See Dictum Revisited, supra, 4 STAN. L. REV. at 509; Abramowicz & Stearns, 
57 STAN. L. REV. at 1040-41. 
 
8 See Dorf, 142 U. PA. L. REV. at 2007 (“Asides – justifiable or not – comprise 
one category of statements commonly labeled dicta.  A second category is 
somewhat more amorphous.  It consists of those elaborations of legal principle 
broader than the narrowest proposition that can decide the case.”). 
 
9 For identifying this pure dicta which I am calling asides, I recommend the 
definition of dicta in Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 961, as an 
excellent way of doing so in difficult cases.  However, that definition uses a 
binary paradigm and thus defines everything else as a holding.  See 
GREENAWALT, supra, at 195 (noting that the Abramowicz and Stearns discussion 
“proceeds on the premise that the choices, difficult as they may be, are basically 
either-or, that the arguable instances would not, and should not, be viewed as 
lying between holding and dicta or as very weak elements of holding or very 
strong kinds of dicta”).  By contrast, this article argues that the propositions that 
would meet the Abramowicz and Stearns definition of holding (which I am 
referring to shorthand as “broad statements” or the “path-to-judgment” reasoning) 
lie along a spectrum where constraining force is inversely proportional to breadth.  
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While asides are clearly dicta, it is difficult to say whether an overbroad 
statement is dicta, because how broad is too broad?  There is an endless spectrum 
of how broad such generalizations can be made and there is no simple place to 
draw the line.10  But if courts are to provide reasons for their decisions, they must 
generalize,11 and if precedent is to stand for anything, at least some 
generalizations must provide some constraint on subsequent courts.12  
How then to reconcile these two propositions: (1) overbroad 
generalizations are not always followed, or can be “narrowed,” and (2) some 
generalizations broader than necessary to decide the case must have some 
constraining force?  This article argues that it is impossible to reconcile these 
realities with a binary paradigm.  It is perhaps something like trying to represent 
four-dimensional spacetime using three-dimensional Euclidian geometry.   
But a more consistent framework can be achieved by positing that 
statements that are not asides should be treated as a spectrum or scalar.  
Statements narrowly tailored to the facts have greater constraining force and 
																																																								
10 See, e.g., Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597, 
614 (1959). 
 
11 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995) (“to 
provide a reason for a decision is to include that decision within a principle of 
greater generality than the decision itself,” such that to “provide a reason in a 
particular case is thus to transcend the very particularity of that case”). 
 
12 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1987). 
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approach the status of binding holding.  Broader or more general statements have 
less constraining force and tend to approach dicta.13  
Although some broad categorizations are more justifiable than others, an 
assessment of breadth provides a starting point, or rule of thumb.  A next step 
would be to attempt to find a material distinction from the facts, or a principled 
way of narrowing the broad statement while remaining consistent with the overall 
reasoning of the precedent case.14  This comports with what courts often do when 
faced with overbroad statements, in accordance with Supreme Court guidance.15  
These inquiries are related because broader propositions encompass more factual 
variation, with a greater possibility that some such factual differences will be 
“material” or justify differential treatment under the law.     
																																																								
13 See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, n.14 (1985) 
(“Some commentators propose that the breadth of a legal directive is inversely 
proportional to its strength.”); Dictum Revisited, supra, 4 STAN. L. REV. at 515 
(“When a legal conclusion is stated too broadly it has a weak value as precedent if 
new facts are different.”); cf. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under The Constitution: 
Dicta About Dicta, 81 NYU L. REV. 1249, 1258 n.23 (2006); Frederick Schauer, 
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 
265, 275-76 (1981). 
 
14 See Re, 104 GEORG. L. J. at 936; J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 187-88 
(1979) (“The ratio is binding in its basic rationale and as applying to its original 
context.  Courts can, however, modify its application to different contexts so long 
as they preserve its fundamental rationale.”). 
  
15 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821) 
(Marshall, C.J.); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400 (1932); Bramwell v. 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 489 (1926); Part III, infra. 
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In this article, a “constrained court” is one generally required to follow the 
precedent of a “precedent court.”16  For example, the Federal Circuit would be 
constrained by Supreme Court precedent as well as its own precedent.  
“Constraining force” or “weight” is the extent to which the constrained court is 
compelled to follow a proposition from a precedential court even if it does not 
agree with the proposition.  In other words, constraining force is the weight a 
statement should have merely based on the fact that it was endorsed in a precedent 
decision, regardless of its persuasiveness as applied to the current situation.  
This article proceeds as follows.  Part I uses hypothetical to illustrate the 
spectrum framework, and explains how the spectrum approach is consistent with 
underlying rationales for stare decisis and furthers the value of judicial candor.  
Part II reviews other approaches to holding and dicta, demonstrating that 
consistent usage is impossible under the prevailing binary paradigm, and shows 
that the spectrum model allows for more meaningful discussion.  Part III 
evaluates some examples from caselaw where courts treat precedent in a manner 
that is difficult to consistently explain under prevailing approaches to holding and 
dictum, but can be explained using the spectrum.   
 
 
																																																								
16 See Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 
(1990). 
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I – The Spectrum Explained 
A. Illustration 
 
Consider a hypothetical statute called the “Ratio Decidendi Park Act” that 
creates a cause of action for anyone whose right to enjoy the park has been unduly 
burdened, and an appellate court decision that reads as follows: 
The Federal Ratio Decidendi Park Act provides a right of action 
against anyone who unduly burdens a person’s enjoyment of Ratio 
Decidendi park.  This case presents the question of dogs in the 
park.  The defendant’s Great Dane, “Slobber,” is over 100 pounds.  
The court below found that Slobber was running free in the park 
and ran roughshod over the plaintiff’s family picnic, scaring the 
plaintiff’s children and ruining their day; thus, the court found, 
unduly burdening the family’s enjoyment of the park.   
 
The defendant argues that she derives substantial enjoyment from 
playing “fetch” with her dog Slobber in the park, that is, throwing 
a stick or other object so that Slobber can run after it and bring it 
back to her.  We do not doubt that this activity is enjoyable, but we 
nevertheless agree with the court below that fetch is not an 
appropriate activity in Ratio Decidendi Park, as a dog playing fetch 
is off leash, unconstrained, running free and thus at risk of unduly 
burdening the ability of others to enjoy the park.  There are other 
parks in the area where the defendant can play fetch with her large 
Great Dane, but there is no other park with the character of Ratio 
Decidendi Park.  All residents should have a reasonable 
opportunity to enjoy this unique landscape.  To that end, dogs are 
not allowed in Ratio Decidendi Park, and accordingly we affirm 
the injunction preventing Slobber from playing fetch in the park.   
 
What is the holding of this case?  It is not clear, but of course this is not 
unusual, courts often state or imply a number of path-to-judgment propositions at 
different levels of generality.17  Even if the court had attempted to signify its 
holding with a “we hold that,” as courts sometimes do but often do not, this would 
																																																								
17 See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, at 44; Arthur Goodhart, 
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 161, 165 (1930). 
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not necessarily settle the question.18  The meaning of a case is often defined and 
refined through subsequent cases.19  To be sure, the In re Slobber court did state 
in its ultimate sentence that “dogs are not allowed in Ratio Decidendi Park,” but 
as Karl Llewellyn has explained: 
[I]t pays to be suspicious of general rules which look too 
wide; it pays to go slow in feeling certain that a wide rule 
has been laid down at all, or that, if seemingly laid down, it 
will be followed . . . . everything, everything, big or small, 
a judge may say in an opinion is to be read with primary 
reference to the particular dispute, the particular question 
before him.”20  
 
The following propositions all explicitly or implicitly arise from the 
decision above, listed from most general (1) to most specific (6). 
1. Dogs are not allowed in Ratio Decidendi Park. 
2. Dogs are not allowed off leash or unconstrained in the park. 
3. Dogs are not allowed to play fetch in the park. 
4. Large dogs are not allowed to play fetch in the park. 
5. Great Danes are not allowed to play fetch in the park. 
6. Slobber is not allowed to play fetch in the park. 
																																																								
18 See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) 
(“A judge’s power to bind is limited to the issue that is before him; he cannot 
transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering the word ‘hold.’”); 
Leval, 81 NYU L. REV. at 1257 (“A dictum is not converted into holding by 
forceful utterance, or by preceding it with the words ‘[W]e hold that . . . .’”). 
 
19 See Jan Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L. J. 1553, 1555 (1974); 
Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.L. REV. 367, 372 (1988). 
 
20 LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, at 38; see also, LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW 
SYSTEM IN AMERICA, at 14 (“Everything, but everything, said in an opinion is to 
be read and understood only in relation to the actual case before the court.”).   
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Under the spectrum model, as the statements become more narrowly 
tailored to the facts before the court (towards 6) they approach the status of 
binding holding.  As the statements gain breadth (towards 1) their constraining 
force weakens, and they tend to approach the status of dicta.  Constraining force 
or weight is thus a scalar quantity with magnitude inversely proportional to 
breadth, for path-to-judgment statements, i.e., statements that are not asides.   
None of these six statements are asides, which count as pure dicta under 
the spectrum model.  An example of an aside would be if the In re Slobber court 
had said “no cats in the park,” as the question of cats in the park was not before 
the court.  But if the court had said, “no pets in the park,” this would be a very 
broad statement rather than an aside, even though it would include cats.  Slobber 
was a pet but not a cat.  While the statement “no cats in the park” would, as an 
aside, have zero constraining force under the spectrum approach, the statement 
“no pets in the park” could be part of the path-to-judgment reasoning and as such 
would have some weak constraining force.   
For further illustration, some examples from real caselaw will be 
examined in Part III, but for now consider a subsequent constrained court faced 
with the question of a seeing eye dog: 
The plaintiff brought the present case under the Ratio Decidendi 
Park Act, claiming that the defendant’s seeing eye dog unduly 
burdened the plaintiff’s right to enjoy the park, because the 
plaintiff is allergic to dogs.  The court below ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff, quoting In re Slobber for the proposition that “dogs are 
not allowed in Ratio Decidendi Park.”  But as we have explained, 
the purpose of the Act is to ensure that all residents have a 
reasonable opportunity to enjoy the unique landscape of Ratio 
Decidendi Park.  Some residents, like the defendant, are blind and 
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need a seeing eye dog in order to have a reasonable opportunity to 
enjoy the park.   
 
Though our previous statement that dogs are not allowed was not 
an aside and thus was not pure dicta, its relative breadth makes it 
only a weak precedential constraint; we weigh that constraint 
against countervailing factors, and consider whether a material and 
principled distinction is to be found.  In re Slobber involved an 
unconstrained dog running free in the park.  Seeing eye dogs, by 
contrast, are categorically constrained on a leash.  The park is large 
enough that if one is bothered by seeing eye dogs, one can avoid 
them.  To the extent that seeing eye dogs create any burden on the 
ability of other residents to enjoy the park, we do not think that 
burden undue when weighed against the countervailing benefit 
these dogs provide in allowing the blind a reasonable opportunity 
to enjoy the park.  We reverse the decision below and hold that 
seeing eye dogs are allowed in the park. 
 
The first sentence of the second paragraph above provides an example of 
the type of language courts could use in applying the spectrum.  Though this 
decision creates a narrowing exception to the broad proposition from In re 
Slobber that “dogs are not allowed Ratio Decidendi Park,” the narrowing is not 
unprincipled.  The opinion here seems plausibly consistent with the overall 
reasoning expressed in In re Slobber, even though it does depart from some of the 
precise language.  Many of the considerations that led the In re Slobber court to 
generalize against dogs are not present with seeing eye dogs, which also present 
countervailing benefits in that they further the goal of allowing residents the 
opportunity to enjoy the park in an exceptional way.  This inquiry of plausible 
consistency with precedent is in some accord with what judges must do as a 
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matter of practice in order to avoid being reversed, or in order to get other judges 
to join their opinions.21 
The facts of In re Seeing Eye Dog were different enough that of the six 
propositions listed above from In re Slobber, proposition 1 was the only one that 
required a departure.  The decision of In re Seeing Eye Dog was not contrary to 
any of propositions 2-6 because the seeing eye dog was on a leash and was not 
playing fetch.  The spectrum approach thus allows a constrained court some 
flexibility to narrow an overbroad generalization without narrowing the decision 
all the way down to its bare facts.   
As precedent propositions get narrower, it becomes more difficult to find a 
principled departure that does not severely violate the overall goals of the 
precedent case.  Propositions 4 and 5 from In re Slobber would seem to have 
strong constraining weight, because the court did not give much reason to think 
that the decision was based on anything particular about Slobber or even about 
Great Danes.  One would be hard pressed to argue, in a court constrained by In re 
Slobber, that another large dog should be allowed to play fetch in the park.  
Propositions 2 and 3 would have somewhat less constraining force, as the large 
size of the dog and the game of fetch seemed as though they did play some role in 
the decision.  The court noted that a dog playing fetch is “running free” and 
emphasized that Slobber was “over 100 pounds.”  Thus a closer question would 																																																								
21 Cf. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 79 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2008) (discussing the “golden rule of precedent” where justices “generally know 
from experience, training, and temperament they cannot be too disdainful of 
precedents or else they risk having other justices show the same, or even more, 
disdain for their preferred precedents.”). 
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be presented by, for example, a small dog that was off leash and unconstrained 
but remaining calm.  It might be possible write an opinion allowing such a dog in 
a manner consistent with the overall reasoning of In re Slobber, though it would 
be more difficult than in the case of the seeing eye dog, as it would require a 
departure from not just proposition 1 but also from proposition 2. 
It is of course somewhat of a fiction to speak of propositions from 
precedent cases as having objective “breadth,” and “weight,” or subjective 
“force.”22  But the spectrum framework, though not perfect, is at least a more 
accurate approximation of our actual usages and practices, as compared with the 
binary paradigm wherein propositions are supposedly either binding or 
unconstraining.  And although it is more nuanced than the binary paradigm, the 
spectrum approach is not so complex as to render the concepts of holding and 
dicta entirely unworkable. 
B. Underlying Rationale 	
According to Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit, one reason that 
dictum is not binding is that it may not have been fully considered to the extent 
that it speaks to issues not directly before the court.23  This reasoning clearly 
applies to asides, but it also supports granting less weight to overbroad statements.  																																																								
22 See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 98-108 (1998) (explaining 
that the “objectivist aesthetic” and the “subjectivist aesthetic” are flawed, but also 
necessary if one wants to “do law”).  
 
23 See Leval, 81 NYU L. REV. at 1263 (“In my experience, when courts declare 
rules that have no consequence for the case, their cautionary mechanism is often 
not engaged.  They are far more likely in these circumstances to fashion defective 
rules, and to assert misguided propositions, which have not been fully thought 
through.”).  Cf. Re, 114 COLUM. L. REV. at 1884. 
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The broader a proposition is, the farther it reaches beyond the facts that were 
directly at issue.  Cases that sweep too broadly in their reasoning can create 
problematic law if applied rigidly to new facts. 24 The concept was explained well 
by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia: 
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general 
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection 
with the case in which those expressions are used. If they 
go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to 
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very 
point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is 
obvious. The question actually before the Court is 
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. 
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are 
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their 
possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely 
investigated.25 
 
Under the spectrum, the less a proposition goes beyond the facts of the 
case, the stronger its constraining force and thus the greater the possibility that it 
will control in a subsequent suit where it applies.  But precisely because it is 
narrower, it will apply to a smaller array of potential future facts.26 
																																																								
24 See, e.g., 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][d] (“Although Whelan reached the correct result given 
the facts of that case, its sweeping rule and broad language extend copyright 
protection too far.”) (referring to Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Labs., 797 
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)); Pamela Samuelson, Reflections on the State of 
American Software Copyright Law and the Perils of Teaching It, 13 COLUM. –
VLA J. L. & ARTS 61, 63-64 (1988) (“The court’s sweeping pronouncements in 
Whelan . . . went far beyond the specific issues presented by the facts of that case 
. . . . and although the Whelan decision has met with a virtual avalanche of 
criticism in the law review literature, the Whelan decision is having some 
influence on trial court decisions.”). 
 
25 Cohens, 19 U.S at 399–400. 
 
26 An interesting corollary thus suggested is that under the spectrum approach, 
there is some sense in which all path-to-judgment propositions have roughly the 
Andrew	C.	Michaels	 The	Holding-Dicta	Spectrum	 DRAFT	–	Jan.	2017		
	 16	
The spectrum approach is also consistent with rationales underlying stare 
decisis, one of which is fairness or equality, or the idea that like cases should be 
treated alike.27  No two cases are exactly alike.  Some differences justify different 
treatment, and some don’t.  So as Frederick Schauer explains, the issue “is not the 
sterile question of treating like cases alike,” but rather “the more difficult question 
of whether we should base our decisionmaking norm on relatively large 
categories of likeness,” that is, how alike do the cases have to be so as to be 
treated alike?28  Professor Schauer concludes that “the prescription to treat like 
cases alike, does not help us choose between a decisional system with a strong 
precedential constraint and one with virtually no precedential constraint.”29   
																																																																																																																																																							
same amount of constraining “power,” but broader propositions spread this power 
out over a wider array of potential cases and as such have less force as applied to 
any particular subsequent case.  In other words, narrow propositions have strong 
constraining weight for the relatively small set of potential cases that they cover, 
whereas broad propositions have weak constraining weight but cover a relatively 
large set of potential cases.  If one were inclined to think in terms of formulas, one 
could represent this idea as:  
 
Power = (Breadth)*(Weight) 
 
Because under the spectrum approach, the constraining force (or weight) of a 
path-to-judgment proposition tends to be inversely proportional to breadth, power 
would remain roughly constant as breadth changes. 
 
27 See, e.g., Alexander, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 9; Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. at 595; Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered 
Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012); Maltz, 66 N.C.L. REV. at 369; RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986). 
 
28 Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. at 596.  
 
29 Id. at 596-97.   
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It is true that under a binary paradigm, the prescription to treat like cases 
alike does not help us decide whether broad statements should be binding or not.  
But if we discard the binary paradigm, the prescription to treat like cases alike 
does support the notion that broader generalizations should tend to have less 
constraining weight.  Broader statements encompass a wider array of potential 
facts, with a greater possibility that some such differing facts will justify different 
treatment under the law.  
Another justification for following precedent is fostering predictability in 
the law, and relatedly, that observers might rely on precedent.30  As will be shown 
in Part III, broad statements from different precedent cases will sometimes 
conflict with each other, so a system granting pure binding effect to all path-to-
judgment statements would be unpredictable, in that interested parties would not 
know which conflicting statement to rely upon.  Given that the Supreme Court in 
cases such as Cohens has cautioned that broad statements (or general expressions) 
must be considered in the context of the facts of the case, there should be some 
understanding that such statements may not always be rigidly applied to new facts 
and thus reliance should tend to decrease as breadth increases.31  Although a 
																																																								
30 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE 
JUDICIARY, 78 (2016); Alexander, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 13; Schauer, Precedent, 
39 STAN. L. REV. at 597; Waldron, 111 MICH. L. REV. at 4 (noting that one of the 
justifications for stare decisis is “the quest for constancy and predictability in the 
law”); Maltz, 66 N.C.L. REV. at 368. 
 
31 Cf. Re, 104 GEO. L. J. at 948 (“Because ambiguous precedent is by definition 
open to reasonable debate, the presence of ambiguity in a higher court precedent 
is a warning that interested parties should hedge their bets rather than rely on 
reasonably disputable meanings.”). 
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spectrum framework is more malleable and therefore may seem less precise and 
less predictable, this malleability is the price to be paid for a single consistently 
workable framework for discussing our system of precedent.32 
Because it provides a single consistent framework, the primary advantage 
of the spectrum is that it encourages increased transparency and candor.  David 
Shapiro calls candor “the sine qua non of all other judicial restraints on abuse of 
judicial power,” and explains that lack of candor “serves to increase the level of 
cynicism about the nature of judges and judging.”33  By fostering increased 
transparency and candor, the spectrum approach serves the rule of law.34  The 
binary paradigm discourages candor.35  As will be shown in the next part, it is not 
just that the courts happen to be inconsistent in their approach; the problem is 
deeper in that such inconsistency is unavoidable under the binary paradigm.  
																																																								
32 Cf. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, at 71 (“People – and there are curiously 
many – who think that precedent produces or ever did produce a certainty that did 
not involve matters of judgment and persuasion . . . simply do not know our 
system of precedent in which they live.”). 
 
33 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 
(1997).  See also, GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
178-181 (1982) (advocating a “choice for candor” and explaining that the 
“language of categoricals” is “particularly prone to manipulation”). 
 
34 See RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW, at 213 (“It is one of the important principles of 
the [rule of law] doctrine that the making of particular laws should be guided by 
open and relatively stable general rules.”); Micha Schwartzman, 94 VA. L. REV. 
987, 990-91 (2008) (“[J]udges must make public the legal grounds for their 
decisions.  Those who fail to give sincere legal justifications violate this condition 
of legitimacy.”). 
 
35 Cf. Shapiro, 100 HARV. L. REV. at 734 (“a judge who believes that a particular 
precedent can be fairly distinguished . . . but who nevertheless describes it as 
‘controlling,’ can properly be accused of lack of candor”). 	
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II – The Spectrum Compared 
 
This part discusses different approaches to precedent and the holding-dicta 
distinction.  First to be discussed are the too narrow approaches to holding: the 
pure facts-plus-outcome approach and the necessity approach.  These approaches 
are too narrow in that they essentially limit every case to its facts, such that a case 
would never stand as precedent for anything beyond its own facts.  Second will be 
the too broad announcement approach, which is too rigid in that it counts 
announced rules along the path-to-judgment reasoning as binding holding 
regardless of how broad.  Third will be the cynical view, which is that courts use a 
narrow approach for distinguishing precedent, but a broad announcement like 
approach when using a precedent for support.  There is truth to the cynical view, 
but it is to some degree an outgrowth of the binary paradigm, under which a 
consistent definition of holding and dicta is impossible.  Fourth will be some 
middle ground approaches: the minimalist announcement approach, the material 
facts-plus-outcome approach, and finally the spectrum approach.   
A. Overly Narrow Approach  
  1) Pure Facts-Plus-Outcome 
 
The pure facts-plus-outcome approach is a non-sequitur because it does 
not allow a case to stand as precedent for anything beyond its own facts.  Under 
this approach, a case stands only for its facts and outcome.  Given that no two 
cases are exactly alike and that there will always be at least some minor factual 
distinction, the pure-facts-plus-outcome approach is somewhat inconsistent with 
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the concept of precedent.36  This approach would thus undermine the values of 
fairness and predictability supporting stare decisis. 
For example, under a pure facts-plus-outcome approach, the hypothetical 
case of Part I(A) would stand only for the proposition that Slobber may not play 
fetch in the park.  It would have no constraining force for even the proposition 
that another Great Dane cannot play fetch in the park.  Though it could of course 
be persuasive, a court that did not find it persuasive would have no obligation to 
give it weight, unless that court happened to be faced with the case of Slobber 
playing fetch in the park, again, (and even then the fact of time would be 
different).  So if precedent qua precedent is to carry any weight at all, a pure all 
facts-plus-outcome approach cannot stand.   
A secondary point about the pure facts-plus-outcome approach is that it is 
a type of result-centered approach, that is, an approach that focuses on the facts 
and the outcome rather than the reasoning. 37  In other words, result centered 
approaches focus on what the court did, rather than what it said about why it was 
doing it. 38  The holding-dicta distinction is immaterial in the context of any 
result-centered approach because the reasoning or words of the decision have no 
constraining weight.39  Later another result-centered approach will be discussed, 
																																																								
36 Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. at 577. 
 
37 MELVIN AARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 52 (1988) 
(“Under a result-centered approach, the rule of a precedent consists of the 
proposition that on the facts of the precedent (or some of them) the result of the 
precedent should be reached.”). 
 
38 EISENBERG, supra, at 52-53.  
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the material facts-plus-outcome approach, which is a middle ground approach and 
is more defensible in that it does allow a case to stand as precedent for something 
beyond its own facts.  But reasoning is seemingly an integral part of the notion of 
caselaw,40 so there is something fundamentally unsatisfying about any approach 
that disregards reasoning as result-centered approaches do. 
2) Necessity 
 
Under the necessity approach, dictum is any statement that is not 
necessary to the decision in the case.  This is the most prominent or traditional 
definition of dictum.41  The necessity approach is not a result-centered approach, 
so it could grant some constraining weight to the reasoning of decisions.  But as 
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns explain, despite its prominence, the 
necessity definition is “indefensible.”42   
																																																																																																																																																							
39 See Alexander, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 25 (explaining that the holding-dictum 
distinction cannot apply to a result model of precedent because under such a 
model “what the court says, as opposed to what it does, is irrelevant to the 
constrained court”).    
 
40 See Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. at 641; n.11, supra. 
 
41 See, e.g., McAllister, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. at 166 (“According to the 
traditional view, dicta include statements in an opinion not necessary to the 
decision of the case; holdings, on the other hand, are statements actually 
necessary to decide the issue between the parties.”). 
 
42 Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 959, 1056 (rejecting the necessity 
approach because it is inconsistent with the general understanding that alternative 
holdings are not pure dicta).  For a discussion of alternative holdings under the 
spectrum, see Part II(D)(3), infra.   
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The simplest problem with the necessity definition is that it is almost 
always possible to decide a case on narrower grounds.43  An insightful 1952 
student note in Stanford Law Review put it succinctly:  
The traditional view is that a dictum is a statement in an opinion 
not necessary to the decision of the case.  This means nothing.  The 
only statement in an appellate opinion strictly necessary to the 
decision of the case is the order of the court.  A quibble like this 
shows how useless the definition is.44 
 
Thus the pure necessity approach ultimately has the same problem as the 
pure facts-plus-outcome approach in that it does not allow a case to have 
precedential weight as applied to any other case.45  One could avoid this 
conclusion by taking the view that a proposition is only unnecessary if there are 
sufficient other grounds for the decision that were actually expressed, regardless 
of whether a narrower ground could be imagined.  This is a different and more 
defensible approach, which I call the minimalist announcement approach, and will 
address below in addressing what I call middle ground approaches.   
Black’s Law Dictionary offers the following advice in defining dictum: 
As a dictum is by definition no part of the doctrine of the decision, 
and as the citing of it as a part of the doctrine is almost certain to 
bring upon a brief maker adverse comment, lawyers are 
accustomed to speak of a dictum rather slightingly, and sometimes 																																																								
 
43 Id. at 1041 (“It is always possible to make statements narrower and more 
dependent on the particular facts of a case, but our system of precedent sometimes 
counts generalizations beyond the facts of a case as holdings.”). 
 
44 Dictum Revisited, supra, 4 STAN. L. REV. at 509. 
 
45 Cf. Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1059 (“Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this understanding of necessity would call into serious question twin 
premises of legal realism: first, that judges make law, and second, that they have 
discretion in doing so.”). 
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they go so far as to intimate a belief that the pronouncing of a 
dictum is the doing of a wrong.  Yet it must not be forgotten that 
dicta are frequently, and indeed usually, correct, and that to give an 
occasional illustration, or to say that the doctrine of the case would 
not apply to some case of an hypothetical nature, or to trace the 
history of a doctrine, even though it be conceded, as it must, that 
such passages are not essential to the deciding of the very case, is 
often extremely useful to the profession.46 
 
Though this appears in a dictionary, it is not a definition, it merely opines 
that dicta (whatever it is) generally should not be cited in a brief but may still be 
“extremely useful to the profession.”  The ambivalent advice however does seem 
to imply or assume something like the necessity definition, that is, that dicta “are 
not essential to the deciding of the very case.”  Thus perhaps fittingly, this 
purported definition of dicta performs precisely the slight of hand that is often 
done by the courts, which is to act as though that the concept of dictum is so 
incontestably simple that it requires no definition.47  
B. Overbroad Announcement Approach 
 
 Rejecting the pure facts-plus-outcome and necessity approaches for being 
too narrow, some relatively recent commentators appear to embrace a version of 
what Melvin Eisenberg calls the “announcement” approach, where “the rule of a 																																																								
 
46 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (10th ed. 2014) (quoting WILLAIM M. LILE ET 
AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 307 (Roger W. Cooley & 
Charles Lesley Ames eds., 3d ed. 1914)).   
 
47 See Dorf, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 at 2003 (“Judges often appear to take for 
granted that discerning the difference between holding and dictum is a routine, 
noncontroversial matter.  Yet an examination of the kinds of statements that 
courts label dicta reveals gross inconsistencies.”); cf., Dictum Revisited, supra, 4 
STAN. L. REV. at 509 (“Dictum is one of the commonest yet least discussed of 
legal concepts.  Every lawyer thinks he knows what it means, yet few lawyers 
think much more about it.  Nonthinking and overuse combine to make for 
fuzziness.”). 
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precedent consists of the rule it states, provided that rule is relevant to the issues 
raised by the dispute before the court.”48  The announcement approach is often 
used by courts and litigants, quoting announced statements from cases as having 
precedential weight.49  In perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of dicta, 
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns offer the following definitions:  
A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen 
decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually 
decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) 
lead to the judgment.  If not a holding, a proposition stated 
in a case counts as dicta.50 
 
The announcement approach generally allows “judges to determine the 
breadth of their holdings.”51  As explained by Professors Abramowicz and 
Stearns, “a court can fit the facts of a case within a broad circle and resolve all the 
fact patterns within that circle, but it cannot then annex an additional circle and 
resolve the fact patterns within that circle too.”52  This reflects Michael Dorf’s 
distinction noted earlier between asides and overbroad statements, (asides would 
be the “additional circle”).53  If a court deciding whether a car is allowed in a park 
																																																								
 
48 EISENBERG, supra, at 55.  
 
49 Id. (“The use of this approach is so common that it needs no extensive 
illustration.  Pick up any reported case and examples will come readily to hand.”). 
 
50 Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1065.  The second sentence of this 
definition makes clear that it assumes a binary paradigm.  See n.9, supra. 
 
51 Id. at 1040-41.   
 
52 Id.  
 
53 See Dorf, 142 U. PA. L. REV. at 2007. 
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were to say “no wheelchairs in the park,” that would be an aside, but if it were to 
say “no vehicles in the park,” that would just be a broad statement, even though it 
would include wheelchairs.  Cars and wheelchairs are two separate non-
overlapping circles, but “vehicles” is a larger circle that surrounds both.  Under 
the announcement approach, it seems that asides are dicta but there is no breadth 
limit on holdings.  To put it differently, under this binary approach, asides have 
constraining force of zero, but path-to-judgment statements have full binding 
force regardless of their breadth.   
The conceptual problem with the announcement approach is that it does 
not sufficiently account for the fact that courts, in explaining their decisions, will 
inevitably make overbroad generalizations.  If decisions are to stand as precedent 
for anything beyond their own facts, they must generalize to some extent.  These 
generalizations in reasoning are not accidental, to the contrary, they at the core of 
our system of precedent.54  But generalizations will not always be perfect; the 
courts cannot be expected to foresee or fully consider all potential fact situations 
falling within the generalizations that they necessarily make.55   
																																																								
54 See Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. at 635 (“The institution we call 
‘law’ is soaked with generality, for one of its central features is the use of norms 
reaching beyond particular events and individual disputes.  Indeed it is more than 
mere coincidence that the very name for the enterprise – law – is the same one 
that scientists use to designate exceptionless empirical generalizations.”). 
 55	LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, at 15 (“The original judge, 
later courts will say, did not have the other possible sorts of cases in mind; now 
we have one of those cases not foreseen by him before us for decision, and we 
must reconsider the overbroad wording he employed . . . and so on.”).		
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To return to the hypothetical of Part I(A), the In re Seeing Eye Dog court 
would seem under this approach to be bound by the prior announcement that 
“dogs are not allowed” and would not have any leeway to create a reasonable 
narrowing exception for seeing eye dogs.56  But the fact is that this type of 
narrowing happens all the time.57  This is why a consistently workable framework 
for holding and dicta cannot treat all path-to-judgment generalizations as pure 
binding holding.     
A pure announcement approach would seem to be in some accord with 
Pierre Schlag’s aesthetic of “the grid,” where “law is stabilized and objectified 
into an orderly field of clearly delineated, neatly bounded, perfectly contiguous 
legal conceptions and propositions,” with the appeal of “stability, predictability, 
and uniformity.”58  But as Professor Schlag explains, the grid is “inert,” and “does 
not move,” such that “even to pose the problem of legal change is already to 																																																								
56 One might attempt to avoid this type of conclusion by arguing for example that 
the In re Slobber court did not really mean to endorse the proposition that all dogs 
are not allowed in the park.  Cf. Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 966 
(“There will often be ambiguities about just what propositions a particular opinion 
endorsed, and where the boundary lines of those propositions lie.”).  But again, 
generalizations in caselaw are inevitable and are not accidental. If cases are to 
stand as precedent for anything beyond their own facts, they must generalize.  
When a court makes a generalization such as “dogs are not allowed in the park,” 
the court often cannot have not considered all possible instances of dogs in the 
park, (this is a fortiori true as the generalizations get broader and the cases more 
complex), but the court nevertheless makes and endorses the generalization.  
 
57 See n.6, supra; see also, EISENBERG, supra, at 55 (explaining that “despite its 
predominance the announcement approach does not describe all judicial practice,” 
as “[m]any cases do deal with precedents in part by using moderate versions of 
the minimalist or result-centered approaches to reformulate the rule announced by 
the precedent court”); see also, Part III, infra. 
 
58 Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1055 
(2002).  
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weaken the grid.”59  If path-to-judgment announcements are generally considered 
pure binding holding, it seems inevitable that holdings will conflict.  This runs 
counter to any claim that the announcement approach has the advantage of 
predictability as compared with a more flexible approach, for if two announced 
rules conflict, it may be difficult to predict which would prevail.60  Both the 
Supreme Court and distinguished commentators have accordingly cautioned that 
general statements must always be viewed in the context of the facts of the case 
decided.61  A consistently workable model of holding and dicta must better 
account for the fact that the announcing court “might have selected its rationale 
without fully anticipating the implications of its immediate holding for a 
significant future case.”62    
C. Cynical Inconsistent Approach 
 
The cynical view is that a court will take a broad approach to precedent it 
wants to follow, and a narrow approach to precedent that it does not want to 
follow.  Karl Llewellyn explains that the doctrine of precedent is “two-headed” or 
																																																								
 
59 Id. at 1065-66.  
 
60 Id. at 1063 (“One problem posed by the multiplication of classification schemes 
is simple: What happens when some lines of division in one scheme sometimes 
register in some other set and sometimes not?  Which classification scheme 
enjoys priority over the other – or are they coequals?”); see also, Part III, infra. 
 
61 See n.15, n.20, n.25, supra. 
 
62 Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1050.  See also, RAZ, supra, at 188 
(“courts may be and often are a little careless in formulating rules”). 
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“janus-faced,” in that a judge will apply one doctrine of precedent when following 
a case and a “wholly contradictory” doctrine when distinguishing a case.63   
But when a court classifies a statement from a precedent case as dicta, 
there is at least a pretense that this means something more than that the court does 
not intend to follow it.  That is, the terms holding and dicta are generally 
presented as constative rather than performative.64  A court would not say “we do 
not agree with this statement, so it is dictum,” rather, it might say “this statement 
is dictum, so we are not required to follow it.”  To use an inconsistent approach to 
dicta is thus to disguise a performative as a constative, and to mask the true basis 
for the decision.65  
Nevertheless, there is truth to the cynical view.66  For example, Michael 
Dorf reviews the Supreme Court’s removal line of cases and argues persuasively 
																																																									63	LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, at 69-70 (“[T]here is one doctrine for 
getting rid of precedents deemed troublesome and one doctrine for making use of 
precedents that seem helpful.”).	
 
64 See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4 (Harv. Univ. Press. 
1975) (explaining that the performative masquerading as a constative can 
“engender rather special varieties of nonsense”); David Gray Carlson, 
Jurisprudence and Personality in the Work of John Rawls, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1828, 1830 n.9 (1994) (“A ‘performative’ is an articulation that demands no prior 
reality for its existence.  A ‘constative’ is a report of some pre-existing reality.”). 
 
65 See Dictum Revisited, supra, 4 STAN. L. REV. at 517-18 (explaining that the use 
of the word dictum “is absolutely indefensible if the primary meaning of the word 
is incorrectness,” because in that case “the word only disguises the true basis of 
decision”); Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act 
Theory and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L. J. 493, 525 (2003) (“the 
Court enacts the constative fallacy by attempting to disguise its performative 
utterances as constative ones”). 
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that the decisions are not consistent.67  But considering the prominent approaches 
that have been discussed so far, it is easy to see why courts are sometimes 
inconsistent in their approach to dicta.  To return to the example from Part I(A), 
under an announcement approach, In re Slobber would be binding even in its 
broadest announced proposition (1), but under a necessity approach, it would 
stand (at most) only for the narrowest proposition (6).  If the only choices are 
these two extremes, then some inconsistency is unavoidable, given the inevitable 
reality of overbroad generalizations.  A subsequent constrained court like the In re 
Seeing Eye Dog court, in reasonably declining to treat proposition (1) as 
dispositive, under a binary paradigm would be forced to conclude that the 
statement is dicta, using one of the narrow approaches such as necessity.  Yet 
such a narrow approach – if consistently applied – is a slippery slope that would 
essentially narrow every decision all the way to its facts, so it would not allow the 
court to use a generalization from another case for support.   
The problem of inconsistency is related to the adversarial nature of our 
legal system.  A litigant generally has incentive to argue for either a strong or 
weak reading of a particular precedent, and may be reluctant to recognize 
ambiguity.  Similarly, a court ultimately will adhere to a proposition or not, which 
can create the illusion of a binary paradigm.  Both courts and litigants are under 
pressure to choose one side over another and to justify that choice, and 
																																																																																																																																																							
66 See, e.g., Andrew C. Michaels, Pot Calls Kettle Dictum: Expanded Secret Prior 
Art in Obviousness, 26 FED. CIR. BAR J. 93 (2016) (exposing inconsistency in 
Federal Circuit treatment of dicta). 
 
67 Dorf, 142 U. PA. L. REV. at 2022-24.  
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accordingly may have a tendency to make questions of precedent seem more clear 
cut than they actually are.  When a court follows a proposition from precedent, it 
can seem as though that proposition had absolute binding effect, though perhaps it 
was merely one factor among many.  Conversely, when a court declines to follow 
a proposition from a precedent case, it may seem as though that proposition was 
treated as pure dicta and was given no constraining weight, though it may have 
simply been outweighed by other countervailing cases or considerations.  Courts 
may have some tendency to foster these illusions as a way of attempting to bolster 
their decisions, intimating that the result is clearly dictated by precedent rather 
than a more subjective balancing of authorities.68   
A consistently workable middle ground framework could help curb 
deceptive manipulation of precedent and thereby further judicial candor and 
legitimacy.  As Professors Abramowicz and Stearns explain: 
																																																								
 
68 See GREENAWALT, supra, at 442 (“[S]imple dichotomies such as holding-
dictum and overruling-distinguishing do not adequately capture our complex 
practices.  Lawyers who want to use concepts in a way that will persuade may not 
need to worry too much about these subtleties, but for scholars who seek to 
illuminate what the practices are really like finding an appropriate terminology is 
difficult.”); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: 
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) (“Judges are people of 
violence.  Because of the violence they command, judges characteristically do not 
create law, but kill it.  Theirs is the jurispathic office.  Confronting the luxuriant 
growth of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or 
try to destroy the rest.”); Pierre Schlag, My Dinner at Langdell’s, 52 BUFF. L. 
REV. 851, 857 (2004) (providing a fictional dialogue on reductionism in law, 
wherein the “Duncan Kennedy” character states: “sometimes, very often actually, 
taking too intelligent a view of the matter will hinder the judge’s effort to reach a 
holding, to achieve a conclusion”); Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 
81 CAL. L. REV. 817, 836 (1993) (“The doctrinal approach is, in short, almost a 
purely rhetorical activity bereft of any significant descriptive depth.”).  
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If the holding-dicta distinction were perfectly clear (a goal that we 
recognize as impossible), then disingenuous manipulation of 
precedents would be immediately recognizable.  That clarity would 
reduce the incidence of manipulation and increase the legitimacy 
of judicial process.69 
 
While perfect clarity surely is impossible, a framework that accounts for 
legitimate narrowing of the inevitable overbroad general statements, while still 
allowing cases to weigh as precedent for something beyond their own facts, 
would be a step in the right direction.  But the prevailing binary paradigm is 
standing in the way of such a framework. 
D. Middle Ground Approach 
 
1) Minimalist Announcement 
 
Under the minimalist announcement approach, the narrowest announced 
rule is the holding, and everything else is dicta.70  This approach is somewhat of a 
hybrid between the necessity approach and the pure announcement approach.  It 
differs from the necessity approach because here it does not matter if the court 
could have articulated a narrower basis, or if such a basis can be imagined.  And 
the minimalist announcement approach differs from the pure announcement 
approach in that instead of counting all path-to-judgment announcements as 
holdings, only the narrowest announced rule is a holding.     
																																																								
69 Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1025.  See also, Dorf, 142 U. PA. 
L. at 2067.  
 
70 Cf. EISENBERG, supra, at 52 (discussing a “minimalist” approach where “the 
rule of a precedent consists of that part of the rule announced by the precedent 
court’s opinion that was necessary for the decision”). 
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One problem with this approach is that it may be difficult to determine the 
narrowest announced rule in a decision.  But even setting this difficulty aside, 
there is a more fundamental problem in that the minimalist announcement 
approach perversely grants broader precedential authority to less thorough 
opinions.  By articulating narrower reasons for its decision, a court would render 
any broader generalizations devoid of constraining force.  In contrast, under a 
spectrum approach, although a narrow rule would have stronger constraining 
weight than a broad one, articulation of a narrower rule would not ipso facto 
eliminate (or even lessen) the constraining force of a broader announcement. 
The minimalist announcement approach thus helps to demonstrate the 
problem with the binary paradigm.  Finding announcement too broad and 
necessity too narrow, one seeks a middle ground.  But any attempt to draw a 
middle ground line between holding and dicta will be arbitrary and unsatisfactory.  
To return to the Abramowicz and Stearns device of a circle, it seems impossible 
to say that once the circle expands beyond a certain size it crosses the line from 
holding to dicta.71  The spectrum approach does not draw a line; rather, it posits 
that constraining force gradually weakens as the circle expands.   
2) Material Facts-Plus-Outcome 
 
The material facts-plus-outcome approach is attributable to Arthur 
Goodhart, who was of the view that the “principle of the case is found by taking 																																																								
71 Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1040-41; See also, Leval, 81 NYU 
L. REV. at 1258 (“There is no line demarcating a clear boundary between holding 
and dictum.  What separates holding from dictum is better seen as a zone, within 
which no confident determination can be made whether the proposition should be 
considered holding or dictum.”).  
Andrew	C.	Michaels	 The	Holding-Dicta	Spectrum	 DRAFT	–	Jan.	2017		
	 33	
account (a) of the facts treated by the judge as material, and (b) his decision as 
based on them.”72  This approach differs from the pure facts-plus-outcome 
approach discussed earlier in that the precedential effect of a case is not limited 
based on all of the facts, only the material facts.  This view is more defensible 
because it allows a case to stand as precedent for something beyond its own facts.  
Though no two cases will have exactly the same facts, some may have the same 
facts in all material respects.  The key then is to distinguish between a “material” 
factual distinction, and a distinction without a difference.73  Professor Goodhart 
explains that “the facts of person, time, place, kind, and amount are presumably 
immaterial unless stated to be material.”74   
The material facts-plus-outcome approach is, like the pure facts-plus-
outcome approach, a result-centered approach.  So the holding-dictum distinction 
is immaterial under this approach; it does not matter whether certain propositions 
of reasoning are holding or dicta because the reasoning has no constraining effect 
in and of itself.75  Under this view, the only relevance of the opinion is in its 
identification of material facts.76     
																																																								
 
72 Goodhart, 40 YALE L. J. at 182.  
 
73 Cf. Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5 HAST. SCI. 
& TECH. L. J. 1, 22 (2013) (explaining that in determining whether a factual 
distinction should make a legal difference, one “must ask why the [factual] 
difference matters in the full doctrinal framework of the question”). 
 
74 Goodhart, 40 YALE L. J. at 169.  
 
75 See Alexander, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 25; see also, n.39, supra. 
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The common criticism of Professor Goodhart’s approach is that it is 
difficult to determine what facts were material.77  Julius Stone demonstrated this 
criticism using the British case of Donoghue v. Stevenson,78 where the plaintiff 
discovered a decomposed snail in a bottle of ginger beer purchased in a café.  
Stone argued that the fact as to the vehicle of harm could be stated at various 
levels of generality as follows: 
An opaque bottle of ginger beer, or an opaque bottle of beverage, 
or any bottle of beverage, or any container of commodities for 
human consumption, or any containers of any chattles for human 
use, or any chattel whatsoever, or any thing (including land or 
buildings).79 
 
But to push back on this criticism, the problem of identifying the correct 
level of generality is somewhat inherent in our system of precedent.80  And some 
degree of flexibility is desirable so as to allow subsequent courts to adjust for 
unforeseen situations and evolving circumstances.81   
																																																																																																																																																							
76 Goodhart, 40 YALE L. J. at 169 (“It is by his choice of the material facts that the 
judge creates law.”).  
 
77 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra, at 53.  
 
78 M’Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] L.R. App. Cas. 562 (H.L. 1932).  
 
79 Stone, 22 MOD. L. REV. at 608. 
 
80 See Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. at 577 (“[I]t is clear that the 
relevance of an earlier precedent depends on how we characterize the facts arising 
in the earlier case.”).   
 
81 Cf. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881) (“The law embodies the 
story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt 
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.  
In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to 
become.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 
(1897); DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, at 413 (“Law’s attitude is constructive: it aims, 
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The spectrum model borrows from Professor Goodhart’s approach in 
allowing a constrained court to narrow an overbroad announcement by drawing a 
principled material distinction from the facts of a precedent case, so long as the 
narrowing is generally consistent with the overall goals and reasoning of the 
precedent case.  The fundamental difference though is that the spectrum approach 
begins with and focuses primarily on the reasoning of the precedent case as 
having constraining weight, whereas the material facts-plus-outcome approach, 
being result centered, focuses on the facts and outcome.82  
Professor Goodhart proposes some rules for determining what facts are 
material, but these rules are somewhat out of touch with the way in which modern 
judicial opinions are written.83  One such rule is that “if the opinion does not 
distinguish between material and immaterial facts then all the facts set forth must 
be considered material.”84  But modern opinions are generally not directly focused 
on distinguishing material and immaterial facts.      
The primary problem with the material facts-plus-outcome approach is 
thus that it does not accord with modern practice, for courts generally focus their 																																																																																																																																																							
in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a 
better future, keeping the right faith with the past.”). 
  
82 See Goodhart, 40 YALE L. J. at 182 (“The principle of a case is not found in the 
reasons given for the decision.”). 
 
83 See Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1052 & n.286 (explaining that 
parts of Goodhart’s analysis “appear dated,” for example how he “carefully 
analyzes the precedential value of cases where courts have not issued opinions 
and where different reporters indicate different versions of the facts, small 
problems today”). 
 
84 Goodhart, 40 YALE L. J. at 182. 
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decisions on reasoning from announced rules in precedent, rather than on 
identifying material facts.85  As Melvin Eisenberg explains, “observation shows 
that courts usually reason from precedent by starting with the rule the precedent 
announced,” rather than “disregarding the rule entirely and instead constructing a 
rule out of the facts of the precedent and its result.”86  Particularly with the advent 
of computerized searching of cases, though not necessarily a positive 
development in all respects, the quoting of snippets of cases has pushed practice 
further in this direction.87  Judith Stinson provides an interesting account of how 
gradual changes to the bluebook citation rules reflect an increasing elevation of 
judicial statements.88   
The material facts-plus-outcome approach does have the advantage of 
providing some weight to precedent while still allowing for reasonable 
distinctions.  But the spectrum framework discussed next has this same 
																																																								
85 See Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1055; Dorf, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. at 2036-37 (“judges typically pay a great deal of attention to the words as 
well as the results of judicial decisions”). 
 
86 EISENBERG, supra, at 55. 
 
87 Stinson, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. at 245-46 (“lawyers and judges increasingly 
rely on the words found in judicial opinions rather than the underlying 
components of those judicial decisions”).  See also, Thomas L. Fowler, Holding, 
Dictum . . . Whatever, 25 N.C. Cent. L.J. 139, 140-141 (2003).  Apparently some 
had begun to notice a shift as early as 1927.  See Herman Oliphant, Presidential 
Address, Association of American Law Schoools (Dec. 1927), reprinted in 14 
A.B.A. J. 71, 71-72 (1928) (“we are well on our way toward a shift from 
following decisions to following so-called principles”).  
 
88 Stinson, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. at 255-258.  See also, Peter M. Tiersma, The 
Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1247 (2007). 
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advantage, and is more in accord with modern practices by placing weight on the 
reasoning of decisions rather than just facts and outcomes. 
3) Spectrum  
 
To use the spectrum approach, first, determine whether the proposition in 
question is what I have been referring to as an aside.89  If it is an aside, then it is 
pure dicta and has no constraining force, though it may of course be persuasive.  
Otherwise, the proposition has some constraining force, with the amount of 
constraining force tending to be inversely proportional to breadth.  A subsequent 
court may find the relatively weak constraining force of broad generalizations 
outweighed by countervailing considerations, and may narrow overbroad 
statements by finding a principled distinction consistent with the overall reasoning 
of the precedent case.  This inquiry correlates with breadth because it will be 
more difficult to find a material distinction from within generalizations that are 
narrowly tailored to the facts of the precedent case.   
Applying the device of the circle,90 to the hypothetical of Part I(A), one 
could think of the six propositions as six concentric circles, with proposition 1 
being the largest (broadest) circle, and proposition 6 being the smallest 
(narrowest) circle.  The circles would be centered around a point representing the 
facts of In re Slobber.  Only proposition 1, the largest circle, covered the facts of 
In re Seeing Eye Dog.  The seeing eye dog facts could accordingly be thought of 
as a point lying outside of all of circles 2-6, and thus just inside the periphery of 																																																								
89 See n.9, supra; Part I(A), supra.   
 
90 See n.52-53, supra, and accompanying text.  
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the largest circle.  The closer the facts before a constrained court lie to the center 
of the precedent circle, the more difficult it is to find principled distinctions from 
all of the surrounding generalizations, and thus the stronger the constraining force 
of the precedent case.     
The general notion of a spectrum involving holding and dicta is not 
entirely new to this article.  Kent Greenawalt raised the possibility of a spectrum 
“according to which the degree of force varies according to multiple criteria,” as 
an “alternative conceptualization” as compared with the traditional binary holding 
dictum distinction, and noted that “what judges actually do probably lies closer to 
this alternative conceptualization than to the traditional dichotomy.”91  The 
possibility of a spectrum was also briefly raised, but dismissed, by Michael Dorf, 
who wondered if “the holding/dictum distinction oversimplifies matters by 
substituting a sharp dichotomy for a multidimensional spectrum.”92  Professor 
Dorf worried that “if this were so, we might have to abandon the distinction 
entirely,” and ultimately rejected “so radical an explanation.”93  
But recognizing the spectrum does not necessarily require that we throw 
up our hands and completely abandon the concepts of holding and dictum.  Asides 
remain pure dictum.  Broad path-to-judgment statements could be referred to as 
weak constraints, narrow ones as strong constraints.  Courts and litigants would 
no doubt still sometimes refer to themselves as “bound” by “holdings” when there 																																																								
 
91 GREENAWALT, supra, at 194. 
 
92 Dorf, 142 U. PA. L. REV. at 2013.  
 
93 Id. 
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is no sufficient reason to deviate from a strong enough constraint, but it should be 
recognized that such utterances are more performative than constative. 
Shawn Bayern has also advocated for a flexible approach to case 
interpretation focusing on context and intent, where “the precedential effect of a 
previously announced rule corresponds to what we infer the court intended to 
announce, given what we know about the limitations in the court’s viewpoint 
arising from the factual context in which the disputed issues were raised before 
the court.”94  Under Professor Bayern’s approach, “announcements from previous 
cases” are part of a “continuum of authority along multiple axes,” precedent 
“precisely to the extent context dictates.”95  Professor Bayern argues “for a 
general interpretive approach that aims primarily to determine the intent of a 
case’s legal announcements.”96  But Professor Bayern’s approach seems to be to 
discard the holding-dicta distinction in favor of his contextual analysis of intent.97  
The spectrum approach set forth in this article provides some structure for 
enhancing the holding dicta distinction rather than discarding it. 
Although breadth is a useful starting point, other considerations, such as 
the existence of alternative lines of reasoning, may affect the weight of the 
																																																								
 
94 Bayern, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. at 137.   
 
95 Id. at 138, 143.  
 
96 Id. at 174.  But cf., Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1054 n.300 
(“Requiring an analysis of judicial intent, however, is unlikely to promote clarity 
in distinguishing holding from dicta.”).  
 
97 Bayern, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. at 126. 
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constraint in a secondary sense.  The general consensus seems to be that 
alternative paths of reasoning are not dicta, because if that were so, a case that 
expressed alternative reasons would have no holding.98  But this reasoning rests 
on a binary paradigm; i.e., it can’t be that both alternatives are pure dicta, so they 
must both be holdings.  In reality though, alternative holdings are sometimes 
treated as having diminished weight.99  Judge Pierre Leval explains that courts 
“often give less careful attention to propositions uttered in support of unnecessary 
alternative holdings,” and he considers such statements as part of a “zone” of 
uncertainty lying between holding and dictum.100  Discarding the binary 
paradigm, the existence alternative lines of reasoning may function to weaken – 
but not eliminate – the constraining weight of any single line of reasoning.  
Though stopping short of a continuous spectrum, certain terminology in 
occasional use suggests a non-binary paradigm.  The term “judicial dicta,” (as 
compared with “obiter dicta”) has been called a “paradox” by Michael Sean 
Quinn because it seems contrary to the traditional binary paradigm.101  Similarly, 
a non-binary approach was suggested by Karl Llewellyn, who distinguished 
																																																								
98 See Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 958 n.15 (“it cannot be the 
case that an opinion that strikes down a law on two grounds rather than one 
expresses no holding”); Dorf, 142 U. PA. L. REV. at 2044; Woods v. Interstate 
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1940). 
 
99 See Michaels, 26 FED. CIR. BAR J. at  98.  
 
100 Leval, 81 NYU L. REV. at n.23.	
 
101 Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and 
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 
716-717 (1999) (“The notion of judicial dicta as semi-binding rules is contrary to 
the theory of stare decisis as classically conceived.  Nevertheless it is a reality.”).  
Andrew	C.	Michaels	 The	Holding-Dicta	Spectrum	 DRAFT	–	Jan.	2017		
	 41	
between the holding, which “must be stated quite narrowly,” and the ratio 
decidendi, which provides the “generally applicable rule of law on which the 
opinion says the holding rested,” and may have “so to speak, second-order 
precedential value.”102  However, Professors Abramowicz and Stearns note that 
this “distinction between holding and ratio decidendi has blurred, as has the 
distinction between dictum and obiter dictum,” and refer to the distinctions as 
seemingly dated.103 
  Larry Alexander appears to endorse a version of the announcement 
approach, which he calls the “rule model,” though he does recognize that the rules 
announced could have a “moderate but not absolute strength.”104  But he 
dismisses as “theoretically indefensible,” a position he takes to be expressed in a 
dissent by Justice Harlan “that a judge may be bound by a narrow, but still general 
rule, with which he disagrees, but not be bound by the broader rule that the 
previous court endorsed and from which it derived the narrow rule.”105  Justice 
Harlan’s position in dissent was as follows: 
The same illogical way of dealing with a Fourteenth Amendment 
problem was employed in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, which 
held that the Due Process Clause guaranteed the protection of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment against state 																																																								
 
102 LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, at 14-15 (“The ratio as 
stated is, of course, always prima facie the rule of the case, but only prima 
facie.”).   
 
103 Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1048. 
   
104 Alexander, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 51. 
 
105 Id. at 18 n.20 (referring to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145 (1968)).  
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action.  I disagreed at that time both with the way the question was 
framed and with the result the Court reached. . . .  I consider 
myself bound by the Court’s holding in Malloy with respect to 
self-incrimination. . . .  I do not think that Malloy held, nor would I 
consider myself bound by a holding, that every question arising 
under the Due Process Clause shall be settled by an arbitrary 
decision whether a clause in the Bill of Rights is “in” or “out.”106 
 
Justice Harlan’s position does seem indefensible to the extent that it draws 
a binding / non-binding line in between the broad statement and the narrow one, 
as there is no reason provided for drawing the line precisely there.  But setting 
aside this binary aspect, the position is rehabilitated.  Justice Harlan appears to 
have been of the reasonable view that while the Malloy Court carefully considered 
the question with respect to self-incrimination, a generalization as to every 
question arising under the Due Process Clause would reach too far beyond the 
Malloy facts to have much subsequent constraining force. 
If the spectrum were somehow adopted into legal practice, wouldn’t courts 
and litigants just argue about where on the spectrum to place a statement, or about 
the relative weights of different propositions?  Yes, surely they would, but in my 
view this is a more meaningful argument as compared with one in which the term 
dicta has no consistent definition.  If dictum has no consistent objective meaning, 
then it is impossible to have a meaningful debate as to whether a proposition is 
dictum.  The binary paradigm breeds inconsistency and is ultimately incoherent.  
The spectrum approach can be thought of as a common battlefield on which the 
two sides of a debate over precedent can more directly engage. 
																																																								
 
106 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 181.  
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But then wouldn’t courts and litigants just find more nuanced ways to 
disagree?  Is this just another (meta) installment in the endless debate between 
rules and standards?107  Perhaps in some sense, but the problem is not just that the 
“rule” definition of dicta is not consistently applied; it’s deeper in that there is no 
consistent definition at all, because the prevailing binary paradigm is incapable of 
supporting one.  A consistent definition is impossible under a binary paradigm.  If 
the concepts holding and dicta are to be used, it seems to me that they should have 
a more consistent meaning.  Otherwise, the terms serve only to disguise the true 
basis for decision, hindering transparency and discouraging judicial candor.108  
The spectrum framework is a suggestion for how to make the concepts of holding 
and dictum more nuanced but still workable; a more accurate and less deceptive 
approximation of actual legal practices.    
III – The Spectrum In Practice 
 
This article will now look at two examples from caselaw and evaluate 
them in light of the spectrum approach as compared with other approaches.  The 
treatment of different precedents cited in these cases, narrowing them or using 
them for support, is difficult to reconcile under any one binary approach, but can 
be explained consistently under the spectrum framework. 																																																								
 
107 See Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. at 383 (explaining that the 
“dialect” of rules versus standards “doesn’t go anywhere” and “is an arrested 
dialect”); Schlag, My Dinner at Langdell’s, 52 BUFF. L. REV. at 859-860. 
 108			See GREENAWALT, supra, at 195 (explaining that a binary holding dictum 
paradigm “invites manipulation by courts, both those setting precedents and those 
following them, thus encouraging a lack of candor”). 	
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A. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States  
 
In this Fifth Amendment Takings case, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit, and in doing so warned the Federal Circuit not to adhere too 
rigidly to broad statements in the Court’s precedents.109 
The alleged taking occurred by way of increased recurrent flooding due to 
changes in release patterns from a dam controlled by the Army Corps of 
Engineers.  The plaintiff, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, owned a wildlife 
preserve along the banks of the Black River in northeast Arkansas.  The 
Clearwater Dam was located upstream from the Commission’s land and was 
constructed by the Corps in 1948.  In 1953, the Corps adopted a plan known as 
the Water Control Manual to determine the rates at which water would be 
released from the dam.  But in 1993, the Corps approved a deviation from the 
plan in response to requests from farmers.  Under the deviation, the Corps 
released water from the dam at a slower rate than usual, providing downstream 
farmers with a longer harvest time, but ultimately causing flooding and damage to 
the Commission’s land.  The Commission objected to these deviations, but the 
deviations continued until 2001, when they were finally abandoned and the 
original plan was put back into effect.110   
In 2005, the Commission filed suit claiming that the flooding caused by 
the deviations from 1993 to 1999 resulted in substantial damage to its land 
																																																								
 
109 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).  
 
110 Id. at 515-517.  
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including the destruction of timber.  At the trial level, the United States Court of 
Federal Claims ruled in favor of the Commission under the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, and awarded $5.7 million to the Commission.111  However, the 
Federal Circuit reversed, finding no taking.112  In doing so, the Federal Circuit 
relied on a 1924 Supreme Court case, Sanguinetti v. United States, which had 
summarized the Court’s Fifth Amendment Takings jurisprudence and then stated:   
Under these decisions and those hereafter cited, in order to create 
an enforceable liability against the Government, it is, at least, 
necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and 
constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to 
an appropriation of and not merely an injury to the property.  
These conditions are not met in the present case.113 
 
The Sanguinetti Court thus found that no taking had occurred under the 
Fifth Amendment.  The statement above is a broad rule: no taking unless certain 
conditions are met, such as “direct result” (i.e., foreseeability), “and” permanence.  
The statement draws a “no-taking” circle around the large class of cases that are 
either not foreseeable or not permanent.114  This circle covered the facts of 
Sanguinetti and led directly to the judgment of no taking – (“These conditions are 
not met in the present case”) – so the statement was not an aside, though it was 
																																																								
 
111 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594 (Fed. Cl. 2009). 
 
112 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 
113 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924) (emphases added). 
 
114 To say that both foreseeability “and” permanence are “necessary” for a taking, 
is to make the conditional statement: if not both foreseeable and permanent, then 
no taking, which may be represented as: –(fp) à -t.  This is logically equivalent 
to: (-f  v -p) à -t, that is, if not foreseeable or not permanent, then no taking.  See, 
e.g., W.V. QUINE, METHODS OF LOGIC 14 (4th ed. 1982).     
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broader than necessary.  A narrower rule such as: “no taking unless foreseeable,” 
would have been sufficient to decide Sanguinetti.   
Seizing on the word “permanent” in the above quote from Sanguinetti, the 
Federal Circuit in Arkansas reasoned that because the deviations from the original 
plan occurred only from 1993-2000 and were never intended to be permanent, 
they were only temporary in nature and as such could not be considered a taking 
under the broad announced rule of Sanguinetti.115  In other words, because the 
government actions were not permanent, they fell within Sanguinetti’s broad 
precedential “no-taking” circle.  Although the panel majority recognized that 
temporary action generally may lead to a temporary takings claim under the 
subsequent Supreme Court decision in First English,116 it was of the view that 
“cases involving flooding and flowage easements are different.”117  In support of 
its flooding distinction, the Federal Circuit quoted Loretto, where the Supreme 
Court had summarized its own takings cases and had stated that they “consistently 
distinguished between flooding cases involving a permanent physical occupation, 
on the one hand, and cases involving a more temporary invasion . . . that causes 
consequential damage within, on the other.”118 
																																																								
 
115 637 F.3d at 1378-79 (“Because the deviations from the 1953 plan were only 
temporary, they cannot constitute a taking . . . .  The deviations in question were 
plainly temporary and the Corps eventually reverted to the permanent plan.”).  	116	First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1924).	
 
117 Arkansas, 637 F.3d at 1374-75.  
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But the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit.  The Court did not 
buy the “flooding is different” distinction that the Federal Circuit had used to 
avoid First English, noting that there was “certainly no suggestion in Sanguinetti 
that flooding cases should be set apart from the mine run of takings claims.”119  
With respect to Sanguinetti and the broad quote which the Federal Circuit had 
relied upon to require permanence, the Court narrowed that proposition: 
[N]o distinction between permanent and temporary flooding was 
material to the result in Sanguinetti.  We resist reading a single 
sentence unnecessary to the decision as having done so much work.  
In this regard, we recall Chief Justice Marshall’s sage observation 
that “general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in 
connection with the case in which those expressions are used.  If 
they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to 
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is 
presented for decision.”120   
 
The Court’s statement that the sentence in question from Sanguinetti was 
“unnecessary to the decision,” sounds in the necessity approach discussed in Part 
II(A)(2), supra, though the Court does not actually say that the sentence was 
dicta.121  So perhaps the Court is using the traditional necessity definition of dicta 
so as to find the quoted sentence from Sanguinetti not binding.  
																																																																																																																																																							
118 Id. at 1375 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 428 (1982)). 
 
119 Arkansas, 133 S. Ct. at 520. 
 
120 Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)). 
 
121 Although aspects of the holding dicta distinction are at play here, neither the 
Federal Circuit opinion nor the Supreme Court opinion in this case would have 
been picked up in the empirical study of dictum by David Klein and Neal Devins, 
which searched for “dictum,” “dicta,” “not a holding,” or “not the holding.”  
Klein & Devins, 54 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. at 2035.  Nor would the majority 
opinion in Lexmark, discussed in Part III(B), infra, have been picked up were it 
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However, earlier in the decision, the Court appears to be using more of the 
announcement approach, quoting First English for the proposition that once the 
government’s actions have worked a taking of property, “no subsequent action by 
the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period 
during which the taking was effective.”122  Under a pure necessity approach, this 
generalization from First English would not have any constraining force, because 
the First English Court could have provided a narrower rule, such as one limited 
to regulatory (rather than physical) takings, or at least one not including 
floodings.123  Yet the Arkansas Court seems to treat that broad generalization as 
having some constraining force.124  If the generalization from First English has 
																																																																																																																																																							
not for the dissent in that case.  Professors Klein and Devins acknowledge that 
their strategy “probably missed some cases in which lower courts confronted dicta 
from higher courts but did not draw attention to the fact that the statements were 
dicta,” but they consider it “highly unlikely that there are a substantial number of 
such cases,” because they “suspect that very few judges would purposefully 
engage in unprofessional conduct by pretending not to notice a statement from a 
higher court that appears to bear on the case being decided.”  Id. at 2042.  But as 
these cases demonstrate, a court is not necessarily acting unprofessionally in 
narrowing a broad statement without using those terms.  Indeed this is related to 
the idea that broad statements are something in between holding and dicta, so it 
wouldn’t be correct to call them pure dicta.  See id. at 2048 (noting that some of 
the apparent reluctance to use the holding-dicta distinction “may be tied to 
discomfort over the drawing of this line”). 
 
122 133 S. Ct. at 519 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 321).  
 
123 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 328 (2002) (describing First English as establishing the rule that “once 
a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a taking, the government 
entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the 
regulation first effected the taking, and ending on the date the government entity 
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation”).  
 
124 See Arkansas, 133 S. Ct. at 520 (noting that Sanguinetti was decided before 
First English, and stating “[i]f the Court [in Sanguinetti] indeed meant to express 
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some precedential weight even though it wasn’t necessary to the decision, as it 
appears that it did for the Arkansas Court, then the Court is not consistently using 
the necessity approach in the Arkansas decision.   
So then maybe the Arkansas Court is using the announcement approach?  
But under a pure announcement approach, the quoted sentence from Sanguinetti 
would in fact appear to be a binding holding as the Federal Circuit had found, 
since it does appear to be part of the path of reasoning that leads directly to the 
result.125  Given that it did not treat the broad statement from Sanguinetti as 
holding, the Arkansas Court is not consistently using the announcement approach 
either.  Thus the Court could be using what I have called the “cynical approach,” 
applying a narrow necessity approach to precedent it wants to distinguish 
(Sanguinetti), and a broad announcement approach to precedent it wants to use as 
support (First English).126  Under the binary paradigm, such a conclusion is 
difficult to avoid.   
However, the Arkansas Court’s approach to Sanguinetti can be reconciled 
with its approach to First English under a spectrum model.  Using the spectrum, 
the quoted sentence from Sanguinetti does have some constraining weight, as it is 
a path-to-judgment statement and not an aside.  However, because it is quite 
broad and reaches far beyond the facts that were at issue in Sanguinetti, its 
																																																																																																																																																							
a general limitation on the Takings Clause, that limitation has been superseded by 
subsequent developments in our jurisprudence”). 
 
125 See Sanguinetti, 133 S. Ct. at 149; n.111-112, supra, and accompanying text.  
 
126 See Part II(C), supra. 
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constraining weight is relatively weak.  The Arkansas Court was able to find a 
principled distinction consistent with the overall goals and reasoning of 
Sanguinetti, namely, that Sanguinetti primarily “rested on settled principles of 
foreseeability and causation.”127  The Court appeared to be of the view that the 
use of the word “permanent” in Sanguinetti may not have been fully considered, 
referring to the “Court’s passing reference to permanence,” and explaining that 
“no distinction between permanent and temporary flooding was material to the 
result in Sanguinetti.”128  The Arkansas Court was able to find whatever weak 
constraining weight the broad statement from Sanguinetti had to be outweighed 
by other factors, such as the constraining force of First English and other 
temporary takings cases.129  Unlike binary approaches such as announcement and 
necessity, the spectrum approach provides a framework that can consistently 
reconcile a court’s treatment of supporting precedent (like First English), with its 
treatment of opposing precedent (like Sanguinetti). 
 
																																																								
127 Arkansas, 133 S. Ct. at 520.  That is, Sanguinetti did not appear to rest on any 
lack of permanence in the flooding, rather, it appeared to rest more primarily on 
the idea that the overflow was not “the direct result of the structure,” or in other 
words that the flooding was not the foreseeable result of the government actions.  
See Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149-150 (“It was not shown that the overflow was the 
direct or necessary result of the structure; nor that it was within the contemplation 
of or reasonably to be anticipated by the Government.”).  The Arkansas Court 
emphasized that by contrast, the flooding of the Commission’s land was found to 
be the foreseeable result of the Corps’ deviated release patterns.  Arkansas, 133 S. 
Ct. at 523 (“The Court of Federal Claims found that the flooding the Commission 
assails was foreseeable.”).    
 
128 133 S. Ct. at 520.  
 
129 See Arkansas, 133 S. Ct. at 520; n.122, supra. 
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B. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Products 
 
In Lexmark Int’l v. Impression Products before the en banc U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the majority and the dissent disagreed, inter alia, 
on how to interpret Supreme Court precedent.130  The majority took a flexible 
approach in some accord with the spectrum model of holding and dicta.  By 
contrast, the dissent seemed to take a more rigid announcement approach. 
The plaintiff, Lexmark, made and sold printers as well as toner cartridges, 
and owned a number of patents covering the cartridges and their use.  The 
relevant cartridges were sold domestically and at a discount but subject to an 
express single-use/no-resale restriction.  The defendant, Impression, later acquired 
the cartridges, not directly from Lexmark, but rather after a third party had 
physically modified them so as to enable re-use, in violation of the restriction.  
Impression then resold the cartridges, and Lexmark sued for patent infringement.  
Impression attempted to defend under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, arguing 
that by selling the cartridges, Lexmark had exhausted its patent rights in those 
cartridges and could no longer sue for infringement.  Impression pointed to the 
Supreme Court decision in Quanta, which had stated that “[t]he authorized sale of 
an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights 
and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use of 
																																																								
 
130 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en 
banc), certiorari granted (Dec. 2, 2016).  
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the article.”131  As this statement on its face covered the facts of Lexmark, 
Impression argued that it should control.   
The majority however found no exhaustion, and distinguished Quanta on 
the grounds that in Quanta, the sales of the patented article were made by a 
licensee of the patent, rather than by the patentee itself, and also the licensee sales 
of the article were not subject to any restrictions.132  Although some broad 
statements from Supreme Court cases such as Quanta would seem to cover the 
facts in Lexmark and thus require a finding of patent exhaustion, the Federal 
Circuit majority narrowed those statements by interpreting them contextually: 
Context is particularly important where, as here, the phrase being 
interpreted comes from judicial opinions not directly deciding 
the point at issue.  Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court 
almost 200 years ago: “It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that 
general expressions in every opinion, are to be taken in 
connection with the case in which those expressions are used.” . . 
. . We bear that maxim in mind in applying the body of Supreme 
Court case law on exhaustion: that body of precedent contains no 
decision against a patentee’s infringement assertion in the 
present circumstances, and the decisions on related 
circumstances require careful reading to determine the best 
understanding of what issues the Court actually decided.133 
 
The dissent, for its part, thought that the majority took too much liberty 
with precedent, stating that the majority’s “justifications for refusing to follow 
Supreme Court authority establishing the exhaustion rule misconceive our role as 
																																																								
131 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008). 
 
132 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 737-38 (“In short, Quanta did not involve the issues 
presented here.  The facts defining the issues for decision, and the issues decided, 
were at least two steps removed from the present case.  There were no patentee 
sales, and there were no restrictions on the sales made by the licensee.”).  
 
133 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 742 (quoting Cohens, 19 U.S. at 399-40).  
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a subordinate court.”134  The dissent stated that the majority “characterized the 
statements of the exhaustion rule in the Supreme Court cases as mere dictum. . . 
.”135  However, though the majority did interpret broad statements contextually 
and narrow them, it did not use the term dicta or dictum.  Thus the dissent seems 
to have assumed the logic of the binary paradigm: because the majority did not 
follow the broad statements from Quanta and similar cases, the majority 
necessarily viewed such statements dicta.   
But the majority may instead have been using something like the spectrum 
approach, according those broad statements some constraining weight but finding 
them outweighed by other factors in light of their breadth and material factual 
distinctions.  The majority explained that the broad statements were made in cases 
such as Quanta which “did not involve restricted patentee sales of patented 
articles,” as were at issue in Lexmark.136  The majority at least arguably drew a 
principled narrowing distinction in this respect, reasoning that because the Court 
in cases such as General Talking Pictures had allowed patentees to impose 
restrictions through licenses, they should be allowed to do so through direct sales 
as well.137  Thus the majority appears to have found the relatively weak 
																																																								
 
134 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting).  
 
135 Id. 
 136	Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 739.  See also, id. at 749 (“we do not think it appropriate 
to give broad effect to language in Univis, taken out of context, to support an 
otherwise-unjustified conclusion here on a question not faced there”). 
 
137 See id. at 735 (“It is undisputed and clear under Supreme Court precedent – 
most prominently, the 1938 decision in General Talking Pictures – that Lexmark 
Andrew	C.	Michaels	 The	Holding-Dicta	Spectrum	 DRAFT	–	Jan.	2017		
	 54	
precedential constraint of broad statements from cases like Quanta to have been 
outweighed by other cases and considerations.138 
The dissent, by contrast, was taking more of an announcement approach, 
stating the Supreme Court “cases impose no such qualification on the rule 
announced.”139  The dissent also seemed to imply that even if the broad 
statements were dicta, they should have been followed simply because they were 
written by the Supreme Court.140  It is indeed sometimes suggested that courts 
have a particular obligation to give serious consideration to Supreme Court 
dicta.141  In fact, as the dissent pointed out, the Federal Circuit has previously 
stated: “As a subordinate federal court, we may not so easily dismiss [the 
																																																																																																																																																							
would not have exhausted its patent rights in those cartridges, upon the 
manufacturing licensee’s sale (the first sale), if a buyer with knowledge of the 
restrictions resold or reused them in violation of the restrictions. . . .  And there is 
no sound reason, and no Supreme Court precedent, requiring a distinction that 
gives less control to a practicing-entity patentee that makes and sells its own 
product than to a non-practicing-entity patentee that licenses others to make and 
sell the product.”) (referring to General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western 
Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938)). 
 
138 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 741.  Aside from General Talking Pictures, another 
consideration appears to have been the majority’s view that the exhaustion 
doctrine is an interpretation of the “without authority” language in 35 U.S.C. § 
271.  See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 734 (“If ordinary congressional supremacy is to be 
respected, exhaustion doctrine in the Patent Act must be understood as an 
interpretation of § 271(a)’s ‘without authority’ language.”).   
 
139 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 
140 See id. at 780 and n.7.  
 
141 See, e.g., In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We should not 
idly ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta.  The 
Supreme Court uses dicta to help control and influence the many issues it cannot 
decide because of its limited docket.”). 
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Supreme Court’s] statements as dicta but are bound to follow them.”142  It is true 
that Supreme Court dicta should not be dismissed “easily,” but it is an 
overstatement to call them binding.143  This should be evident for example from 
the discussion of Arkansas in Part III(A), supra, where the Supreme Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit and cautioned it not to obstinately or rigidly apply 
such “general expressions” from Supreme Court precedent but rather to pay 
attention to context.144   As Judge Leval has explained: 
Anything the Supreme Court says should be considered with care; 
nonetheless, there is a significant difference between statements 
about the law, which courts should consider with care and respect, 
and utterances which have the force of binding law.  The Supreme 
Court’s dicta are not law.145 
 
																																																								
 
142 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (emphasis added). 
 
143 One could, however, argue that broad path-to-judgment statements from 
Supreme Court precedent deserve additional constraining weight on lower courts 
as compared with such statements from a court’s own precedent, given different 
considerations as between vertical stare decisis and horizontal stare decisis.  See 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. at 576 (“the hierarchical ordering of 
decisionmakers implicates considerations different from those involved when a 
decisionmaker is constrained by its previous actions as opposed to the orders of 
its superiors in the hierarchy”); Stinson, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. at 242-243 (“The 
United States Supreme Court occupies a unique position in our legal system.  In 
direct contrast to the theories of judicial restraint that underlie stare decisis, many 
advocate that the Supreme Court is not only able to act without restraint, but 
sometimes is obligated to do so.”).   
 
144 Arkansas, 133 S. Ct. at 520 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)).  
The proposition in question from Sanguinetti was a broad statement rather than an 
aside, and as such was not pure dicta under the spectrum, but if broad statements 
are not to be absolutely binding, then pure dicta surely are not either. 
 
145 Leval, 81 NYU L. REV. at 1274. 
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The spectrum framework is a common ground where the majority and 
dissent could have engaged more directly, forcing each side to more directly 
address the opposition.  The dissent could for example have acknowledged that 
the broad statement from Quanta might not have had absolute binding effect on 
its own, but argued that the fact that the Court has repeatedly made such 
statements multiplies the constraining weight.146  And the majority could have 
acknowledged that the broad statements from cases like Quanta did have some 
weak constraining weight, but explained that it found those constraints 
outweighed by other factors.  Such acknowledgements are difficult under a binary 
paradigm, where a statement must be either binding holding or pure dicta, but 
they are at least possible under a spectrum.  Thus although disputes would remain 
as to its application, the spectrum approach has the advantage of facilitating 
judicial candor and more transparent common analysis.147 
Conclusion 
 
Modern scholars correctly reject the facts-plus-outcome approach and the 
necessity approach for being inconsistent with the concept of precedent, as under 
these methods a case stands as precedent for nothing beyond its own facts.  But 
with the announcement approach, the pendulum swings too far in the other 
direction, with sweepingly broad announced rules achieving the status of binding 																																																								
146 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 774-776 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (listing quotes from nine 
Supreme Court cases). 
 
147 See Abramowicz & Stearns, 57 STAN. L. REV. at 1025 (“We believe that a 
regime that encourages a judge to disguise true beliefs about cases ultimately 
undermines the rule of law, first by reducing predictability and legal clarity, and 
second by inhibiting the emergence of nuanced doctrine.”). 
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holding.  The all or nothing nature of this debate rests on the prevailing binary 
paradigm, where a proposition must be either holding or dicta, one or the other. 
When we attempt to discuss the complex reality of precedent using a 
binary holding dicta paradigm, what we end up with is inconsistency.  A court 
that wants to distinguish a broad proposition will use a narrow necessity 
definition, while one that wants to use such a proposition for support will take a 
broad announcement approach.  The incoherent binary paradigm stems in part 
from the binary nature of judging.  Courts must ultimately decide the case one 
way or the other, and in explaining their decisions, have an understandable 
tendency to spin statements from precedent as holding or dicta in whatever way 
supports the desired result.  But the inconsistency is not acknowledged.  Courts 
maintain the façade that there is some objective meaning to holding and dicta; that 
the terms are constative rather than performative.  The effect is to disguise the 
true basis for decision.   
This article offers a spectrum as a more consistent and transparent 
framework, one that accounts for reasonable legitimate narrowing of overbroad 
statements, while still according some weight to precedent.  Though more 
nuanced than a binary framework, this approach remains workable by first setting 
aside “asides” as pure dictum, and then treating the path-to-judgment reasoning as 
a spectrum, along which constraining force tends to be inversely proportional to 
breadth.  Such a framework would encourage disputes over the weight of 
precedent to meet head on instead of sailing past each other on different 
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definitional ships, thereby facilitating judicial candor and more refined analysis, 
serving the values of transparency and rule of law.   
Given that the holding-dicta distinction is rather fundamental in our legal 
system, the amount of discussion it has engendered is not surprising.  What is 
perhaps surprising is the persistent grab bag of contradictory approaches.148  
Although some have begun to question the binary nature of the holding dicta 
distinction, it is still often taken for granted.  It may be that the binary paradigm is 
somewhat of a hidden assumption standing in the way of a more meaningful 
framework for holding and dicta.149 
																																																								
148 But see, Dictum Revisited, supra, 4 STAN. L. REV. at 509 (“Few desire to 
endanger such a useful tool by subjecting it to the destructive light of analysis.”); 
Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2053, 2055 (1993) (“There 
is, thus, a very real sense in which the judge wants not to see, wants not to 
understand, wants not to pursue certain lines of inquiry.”); n.68, supra. 
 
149 Cf. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 49-50 
(1983) (“[C]ategorical schemes have a power that is greatest when it is least 
noticed.  They channel the attention of those who use them, structuring experience 
into the focal and the peripheral.”).	
